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Michael Smith. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell ( 1994 ) Copy BIBTEX. Abstract. What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ... Like. Recommend. Bookmark. Cite. Options. Edit. Author's Profile. Michael Smith. Princeton University. Follow.
5 de dic. de 1994 · The Moral Problem. Michael Smith. Wiley, Dec 5, 1994 - Philosophy - 240 pages. This widely anticipated volume offers a systematic introduction to and striking analysis of the central issues...
The Moral Problem is a 1994 book by Michael Andrew Smith, in which the author tries to provide a defense of moral realism. It is Smith’s most influential work for which he was awarded an American Philosophical Association book prize in 2001. Reception. The book was reviewed by James Dreier, David Copp and James Lenman.
Michael Smith: The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, 226 pp. The eponymous problem resides in the seeming incompatibility of the following three plausible-seeming claims:objectivism – that moral judge-ments express beliefs apt to be objectively true or false; internalism –that
En 1994, Smith fundó un club de adolescentes, llamado Rocketown, en Franklin, Tennessee. Más tarde, en 2003, el club se mudó a otra ciudad, a un almacén reformado en Nashville. El lugar tenía una pista de baile grande, también una pista de patinaje cubierta grande, y una cafetería con música acústica en vivo.
Smith's rationalism is derived from two theses: first, the moral * This article is a critical notice of Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). I was given valuable assistance by several people who wrote comments on an earlier version: Philip C. Clark, Stephen Darwall, John Deigh, Thomas Hurka,
The Moral Problem, by Michael A. Smith. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994. Pp. xiii + 226. H/b. ?45.00, $49.95. P/b. ?14.99, $21.95. The title problem that Michael Smith tries to answer in his book is the prob-lem of reconciling three apparently mutually inconsistent propositions about ethics. They are (p. 12):
