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Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (21 de setembro de 1929 — 10 de junho de 2003) foi um filósofo moralista inglês. Vida pessoal e carreira. Nasceu em Essex, estudou no Balliol College de Oxford, e foi membro do corpo docente do All Souls e do New College. Foi professor de ...
Bernard Williams, in full Sir Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, (born Sept. 21, 1929, Westcliff, Essex, Eng.—died June 10, 2003, Rome, Italy), English philosopher.He studied at the University of Oxford and served in the Royal Air Force (1951–53). He was Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge (1967–79), Monroe Deutsch Professor at the University of California ...
20 de abr. de 2024 · In this Special Issue, we want to focus on Bernard Williams’s conception of morality. One of his original insights in this area was to point out a schism or, at the very least, a mismatch between the ambitions of moral philosophy and what the unique moral lives experienced from the first-person standpoint comprise.
27 de oct. de 2016 · For half a century, the English philosopher Bernard Williams (b. 1929–d. 2003) was a distinctive and individual voice in Anglophone philosophy. He made major original contributions to the history of philosophy, epistemology, the philosophy of personal identity, and ethics. His central concern was the tension between human significance and ...
1 de feb. de 2006 · Bernard Williams (1929-2003) was a leading influence in philosophical ethics in the latter half of the twentieth century. He rejected the codification of ethics into moral theories that views such as Kantianism and (above all) utilitarianism see as essential to philosophical thinking about ethics, arguing that our ethical life is too untidy to be captured by any systematic moral theory.
バーナード・ウィリアムズ（Bernard Arthur Owen Williams、1929年 9月21日 - 2003年 6月10日）は、イギリスの道徳哲学者。 道徳的な決定に関する非個人的な要素を強調するカント主義や功利主義の 倫理学 の学説に反論を唱え、実践的な道徳生活は個人的な計画と関連していると論じた。
Bernard Williams - Morality, Objectivity, Philosophy: Some philosophers, in the tradition of David Hume (1711–76), have denied that there can be objective truth in ethics on the ground that this would have to mean, very implausibly, that moral propositions are true because they represent moral entities or structures that are part of the furniture of the world—moral realities with which ...
