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  1. 2.4 Mixed strategies in normal form games. A player who uses a mixed strategy in a game intentionally introduces randomness into her play. Instead of picking a deterministic action as in a pure strategy, a mixed strategy user tosses a coin to determine what action to play. Game theorists are interested in mixed strategies for at least two ...

  2. Example 2.1.1 : Zero-sum in Poker. Consider a poker game in which each player comes to the game with $100 $ 100. If there are five players, then the sum of money for all five players is always $500 $ 500. At any given time during the game, a particular player may have more than $100 $ 100, but then another player must have less than $100 $ 100.

  3. Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium. a mixed strategy is one where a player plays (some of) the available pure strategies with certain probabilities. concept best understood in repeated games, where each player’s aim is to keep the other guessing. Examples: Rock–Scissors–Paper game, penalty kicks, tennis point, bait cars, tax audits, drug ...

  4. At mixed strategy Nash equilibrium both players should have same expected payoffs from their two strategies as shown above. At mixed strategy Nash equilibrium both players should have same expected payoffs from their two strategies. Considering Player X, If it plays U, it'll receive a payoff of 2 with probability q and 1 with probability (1-q).

  5. end of this paper. However, we will illustrate an example to show the di erences between pure strategies and mixed strategies and how mixed strategies can induce equilibriums in cases where pure strategies cannot. Example 2.6. Suppose there are two players in a game, player 1 and player 2. Each player ips a fair coin.

  6. the mix must yield the same expected payo . We will use this fact to nd mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria. Finding Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria. Let’s look at some examples and use our lesson to nd the mixed-strategy NE. Example 1 Battle of the Sexes a b A 2;1 0;0 B 0;0 1;2 In this game, we know that there are two pure-strategy NE at (A;a) and ...

  7. for mixed strategies in a game solves the problem of possible nonexistence of Nash equilibrium, which we encountered for pure strategies, automatically and almost entirely. Nash’s celebrated theorem shows that, under very general cir-cumstances (which are broad enough to cover all the games that we meet in this book and many more besides), a ...