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David Kellogg Lewis (September 28, 1941 – October 14, 2001) was an American philosopher. Lewis taught briefly at UCLA and then at Princeton University from 1970 until his death. He is closely associated with Australia, whose philosophical community he visited almost annually for more than 30 years.
David Kellogg Lewis (September 28, 1941 – October 14, 2001) was an American philosopher.Lewis taught briefly at UCLA and then at Princeton from 1970 until his death. He is also closely associated with Australia, whose philosophical community he visited almost annually for more than thirty years.He made contributions in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of probability ...
David K. Lewis. Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University. Verified email at lists.berkeley.edu. Metaphysics epistemology logic language mind. Articles Cited by Public access. Title. ... DK Lewis. the Journal of Philosophy 65 (5), 113-126, 1968. 1642: 1968: How to define theoretical terms. D Lewis. The Journal of Philosophy 67 (13), 427-446 ...
19 de dic. de 2021 · Many believe that David Lewis had one of the finest minds of any modern philosopher. His concept of modal realism – the idea that infinite alternative worlds exist concretely in spacetime ...
28 de ago. de 2001 · The philosopher Robert Nozick describes, but does not develop, the notion in his doctoral dissertation ... “Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis’ Game Theory”, Economics and Philosophy, 19: 175–210. Dégremont, Cédric, and Oliver Roy, 2012, “Agreement Theorems in Dynamic-Epistemic ...
Carnap’s second Aufbau and David Lewis’s Aufbau: David J. Chalmers. 7. Lewis: metaphysics first: Frank Jackson. 8. Naturalness, arbitrariness, and serious ontology: A.R.J. Fisher. 9. Two kinds of Platonism and categorial semantics: John Bigelow and Martin Leckey. 10. David Lewis and his place in the history of formal semantics: Angelika ...
Lewis’s Metaphysics 4 tions. But his realism about possible worlds consists in much more than inclusion of such entities into his ontology; indeed, it would probably be better to call Lewis a “reductionist” about modality—reductionist in a way that distinguishes him from virtually every other philosopher of modality.
