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Stephen Finlay Australian Catholic University Archival history Archival date: 2014-11-10 View all versions. Categories. Supererogation in Normative Ethics. Keywords. morality and self-interest supererogation importance. Reprint years. 2011. Analytics. Added to PP 2009-09-15 Downloads 1,202 (#9,961)
18 de abr. de 2016 · Stephen Finlay’s Confusion of Tongues (COT) is an ambitious book. Its first half advances a unifying semantics for normative words, including ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’. In the second half, he argues that this semantics, combined with a single pragmatic principle, can explain the uses of such expressions of special interest to ethicists.
Stephen Finlay. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20 (2006) Copy B IB T E X. Abstract Bernard Williams's motivational reasons-internalism fails to capture our first-order reasons judgements, while Derek Parfit's nonnaturalistic reasons-externalism cannot explain the nature or normative authority of reasons. This paper offers ...
Defining Normativity. Stephen Finlay. In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104 ( 2019 ) Copy BIBTEX.
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9 de oct. de 2007 · Four different faces of ‘moral realism’ are distinguished: semantic, ontological, metaphysical and normative. The debate is presented as taking shape under dialectical pressure from the demands of (i) capturing the moral appearances; and (ii) reconciling morality with our understanding of the mind and world.
19 de may. de 2007 · Stephen Finlay. Guys do you think if all our forum members threw a fiver into a hat (XXXL) we'd be able to persuade this man to come out and remind us just how good he can be. Has to be one of the greatest unfulfilled talents in the history of rallying.
