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  1. en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Roger_CrispRoger Crisp - Wikipedia

    Roger Stephen Crisp (born 23 March 1961) is fellow and tutor in philosophy at St. Anne's College, Oxford. He holds the university posts of Professor of Moral Philosophy and Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy.

  2. Roger Crisp | Faculty of Philosophy. Professor of Moral Philosophy. Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St Anne's College. roger.crisp@st-annes.ox.ac.uk. See college webpage: https://www.st-annes.ox.ac.uk/cpt_people/crisp-professor-roger/ Area of Specialisation: Ancient Philosophy. Ethics. History of Philosophy. Moral Philosophy.

  3. Director, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. As well as being Director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Roger Crisp is Professor of Moral Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, and Uehiro Fellow in Philosophy at St Anne’s College, Oxford.

  4. Prof. Roger Crisp was in the first male cohort at St Anne’s in 1979, admitted to read Lit. Hum. After a BPhil. and DPhil. in Philosophy, he was appointed to a College Fellowship in 1991. He was Findlay Visiting Professor at Boston University in 2010-11.

  5. Professor Roger Crisp. Roger Crisp is Professor in Moral Philosophy and Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St Anne's College. About Professor Crisp. Faculty of Philosophy; St Anne's College; The Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics; Topical Publications (Book) 'Reasons and the Good'

  6. Professor of Moral Philosophy. Faculty of Philosophy, St Anne's College. Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St Anne's College. roger.crisp@st-annes.ox.ac.uk. See Faculty webpage. Research interests: Moral philosophy, including ancient moral philosophy (especially Plato and Aristotle).

  7. In Reasons and the Good Roger Crisp answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Fundamental to ethics, he claims, is the idea of ultimate reasons for action; and he argues controversially that these reasons do not depend on moral concepts.